The 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles (LA) are less than two years away. On the heels of a successful 2026 World Cup run, is LA prepared for the Olympics, which will bring 10 times as many spectators scattered across dozens of venues?
One big question is how Los Angeles plans to manage its visible homelessness crisis. According to the 2026 Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) annual Point-in-Time (PIT) Count, there were an estimated 49,000 people living unsheltered in LA County, a 3.3% increase from the year before. Within the City of Los Angeles specifically, unsheltered homelessness rose 7.9% to 29,115 people. At the same time, economic headwinds, persistent housing shortages, and drastic cuts to federal funding for housing, food, and health care may push ever more people into homelessness. Preparation for the Olympics lands on top of an already-shifting policy landscape defined by the expansion of homeless encampment clearances or “resolution” efforts and a more permissive enforcement environment following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Grants Pass v. Johnson, which cleared the way for municipalities to enforce anti-camping ordinances even where shelter capacity is inadequate.
The Olympic venue list is now largely finalized, but the operational and security planning around those venues has still not been made public. What is already established is a pattern, repeated at prior Olympic Games and other major global events, of heightened enforcement and displacement in the immediate vicinity of venue sites. Reporting by LAist indicates county homelessness officials have been told to plan for security perimeters as wide as a mile around venues. In that reporting, LA County’s own preliminary needs assessment put the projected number of unsheltered people in the areas around venues at roughly 1,600. In this report, we estimate at least 5,975 in LA County, including 5,501 in the City of LA.
Estimated adult unsheltered population within 1 mile of official game venues:
Will LA2028 be remembered as the displacement Olympics, or the housing Olympics? Angelenos take pride in our history as successful hosts of the 1932 and 1984 Olympics, but 1984 saw widespread displacement of unhoused people with little public attention. This report represents our first step in monitoring the impacts of the LA2028 Olympics preparations on the well-being of unhoused populations.
This report estimates how many people living outside would be affected by the proposed Olympic security perimeters to understand the implications of Olympic security planning for an already-strained homelessness response system. To begin to inform research strategies, we begin by asking how many unsheltered Angelenos live within the geographic footprint where venue-related security policies could apply? We explore the implications of different security perimeter sizes and explore geographic variations in impact.
The goal of this reporting is not to challenge the county estimate but merely to show that a much larger number of people could be affected based on what is known publicly about security zones. We will update our maps and estimates as more knowledge becomes public.
We derive our estimates by linking spatial data representing the boundaries of Olympic venue sites with data from LAHSA’s 2026 Point-in-Time (PIT) Count, which provides the most detailed available snapshot of homelessness in the Los Angeles Continuum of Care (CoC). The CoC covers all cities and unincorporated areas in Los Angeles County except Pasadena, Long Beach, and Glendale. Thus our estimates represent undercounts of potential impact. More detailed methodological details are provided on the Methodology tab.
We do not yet know whether officials will draw security perimeters from each venue’s full perimeter or from a single reference point; we use full site perimeters because we believe that better reflects how US Secret Service officials would approach security, but a point-based approach would yield an estimate about 30% smaller.
The scenarios below vary the buffer radius to show the potential impact of different security perimeter sizes.
| Buffer | Est. people | % of unsheltered pop. | Est. people | % of unsheltered pop. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.5mi | 2,191 | 5.0% | 2,058 | 7.4% |
| 1mi | 5,975 | 13.6% | 5,501 | 19.8% |
| 2mi | 15,988 | 36.3% | 13,745 | 49.6% |
These estimates showcase how the perimeter distances matter enormously. If the security perimeter were reduced to 0.5 miles, then we estimate that about 2,100 people would be living within the perimeter (2,058 in LA City, 2,191 in LA County), reducing the affected population by roughly two-thirds. By contrast, a doubling of the perimeter to 2 miles would affect almost 50% of all unsheltered individuals in the City of LA. Officials have discussed perimeters “as wide as a mile,” and our 1-mile estimate is the headline figure used throughout this report, but if the final security footprint ends up smaller or larger, the affected population changes substantially in either direction.
We report which venues contribute most to the affected population. To do so, we group the official venues into groups corresponding to the LA2028 Olympic zones (e.g., DTLA, Exposition Park, Venice Beach) and calculate two estimates for each zone: a stand-alone (“solo”) estimate based on that zone’s buffer alone, and its marginal contribution to the total affected population. The table below reports the solo share only.
The venues driving the majority of the impact are those located in Downtown LA and Exposition Park zones (i.e., Peacock Theatre, Crypto.com Arena, LA Convention Center, Exposition Park, Galen Center, and BMO Stadium), which together account for 53.8% of the total estimated affected population. Within that combined figure, the DTLA zone (Peacock Theatre, Crypto.com Arena, LA Convention Center) accounts for 40.7% on its own, and the Exposition Park zone (Exposition Park, Galen Center, BMO Stadium) accounts for 20.1%. The next-largest contributor is the venue in Venice Beach, accounting for 11.4%.
That venue zone-level concentration carries straight through to the city’s political boundaries. We map each Council District by the share of that district’s own unsheltered population that falls within a mile. CD1 (represented by Eunisses Hernandez) and CD9 (represented by Curren D. Price, Jr.) stand out both in absolute numbers and as a share of each district’s own unsheltered population; CD9 is home to the Downtown LA and Exposition Park venues described above, and CD1 share overlaps with the one-mile perimeters surrounding the DTLA zones. An estimated 1,662 people (~55% of CD1’s unsheltered population) and 1,098 people (~38% of CD9’s) fall within a mile of an official venue, respectively. CD4 (Nithya Raman) and CD11 (Traci Park, home to Venice Beach) also show relatively high shares, at ~34% and ~33%, respectively, followed by CD6 (Imelda Padilla) at ~26%. Several districts (e.g., CD3, CD5, CD7, CD10, and CD12) see little to no overlap. To visualize variation in impact at the CoC level, visit the Totals tab to view results by Service Planning Area (SPA) (broader geographic regions used by LA County for health and human services planning) and Supervisorial District (SD).
Hover over a venue zone for its estimated affected population, shown both as a stand-alone (“solo”) estimate for that zone’s buffer alone and as its marginal contribution to the total.
| Olympic Zone (Venues) | Est. people | % of total |
|---|---|---|
| DTLA † — DTLA Arena, LA Convention Center Hall 1, LA Convention Center Hall 2, LA Convention Center Hall 3, Peacock Theater | 2,430 | 40.7% |
| Exposition Park † — Exposition Park Stadium, Galen Center, LA Memorial Coliseum | 1,203 | 20.1% |
| Venice — Venice Beach, Venice Beach Boardwalk | 679 | 11.4% |
| Dodger Stadium — Dodger Stadium | 635 | 10.6% |
| Valley — Valley Complex 1, Valley Complex 2, Valley Complex 3, Valley Complex 4 | 614 | 10.3% |
| Inglewood — 2028 Stadium, Intuit Dome | 171 | 2.9% |
| Griffith Park — Griffith Observatory, LA Zoo | 123 | 2.1% |
| Port of Los Angeles — Port of Los Angeles | 112 | 1.9% |
| Carson — Carson Courts, Carson Field, Carson Stadium, Carson Velodrome | 107 | 1.8% |
| Whittier Narrows — Whittier Narrows Clay Shooting Center | 98 | 1.6% |
| Pomona — Fairgrounds Cricket Stadium | 74 | 1.2% |
| Universal City — Comcast Squash Center at Universal Studios | 53 | 0.9% |
| Arcadia — Santa Anita Park | 48 | 0.8% |
| Riviera — Riviera Country Club | 26 | 0.4% |
| City of Industry — Industry Hills MTB Course | 20 | 0.3% |
| Estimated people and % of total reflect each zone’s 1 mile buffer independently. Overlapping zones are not netted out, so these values do not sum to the total affected population. Hover over the buffer areas on the map to see the number of unique contributions. † DTLA and Exposition Park zones overlap enough that removing either one only marginally reduces the combined total. Pasadena and Long Beach venues are excluded from this map and table: both cities conduct their own Point-in-Time counts independently of LAHSA's Los Angeles Continuum of Care count, so no PIT data is available to estimate their unsheltered population within a buffer. |
Hover over a district for its estimated count and share; toggle on “Buffers around venue zones” in the layer control to overlay the same venue-zone buffers shown in the Venue Zones tab above.
| Council District (CD) | Est. people | % of CD's own unsheltered pop. | Representative |
|---|---|---|---|
| Council District 1 | 1,662 | 55.3% | Eunisses Hernandez |
| Council District 2 | 36 | 3.0% | Adrin Nazarian |
| Council District 3 | 1 | 0.1% | Bob Blumenfield |
| Council District 4 | 127 | 33.5% | Nithya Raman |
| Council District 5 | 0 | 0.0% | Katy Yaroslavsky |
| Council District 6 | 608 | 26.4% | Imelda Padilla |
| Council District 7 | 0 | 0.0% | Monica Rodriguez |
| Council District 8 | 198 | 7.2% | Marqueece Harris-Dawson |
| Council District 9 | 1,098 | 38.2% | Curren D. Price, Jr. |
| Council District 10 | 0 | 0.0% | Heather Hutt |
| Council District 11 | 584 | 32.6% | Traci Park |
| Council District 12 | 0 | 0.0% | John Lee |
| Council District 13 | 125 | 8.0% | Hugo Soto-Martínez |
| Council District 14 | 930 | 16.7% | Ysabel J. Jurado |
| Council District 15 | 132 | 9.2% | Tim McOsker |
| % of area's own=share of that geography's unsheltered population inside buffer zone. |
Unlike the map above, this chart slices the total affected population itself (not each district’s own population) by Council District, showing which districts carry the largest share of everyone estimated to fall within a venue buffer. Hover over a slice for its estimate and share.
We break down the composition of the affected population by type of unsheltered homelessness. Unsheltered type is presented both as units (number of vehicles and tents/makeshift shelters, and number of persons rough sleeping) and as people (people living in those vehicles or tents/makeshift shelters).
Rough sleepers make up the single largest category, an estimated 1,744 people, or 29% of the affected population—modestly overrepresented compared to their 25.1% share of the CoC’s unsheltered population overall. Makeshift shelters (1,174 people, ~20%) and tents (1,073 people, ~18%) make up the next-largest shares, and both run higher near venues than CoC-wide (15.1% vs. 19.6% for makeshift shelters; 13.6% vs. 18.0% for tents). People sleeping in vehicles (cars, vans, and RVs combined) account for roughly a third of the affected population, with those in RVs accounting for about 14% of the total—the reverse pattern from the other categories, since RVs make up 23.7% of the CoC’s unsheltered population overall but only 14.1% near a venue, making RV dwellers noticeably underrepresented. Cars and vans hold roughly steady between the two. See the comparison chart below for the full picture.
| Type | Est. people | % of affected |
|---|---|---|
| Rough sleepers | 1,744 | 29.2% |
| Cars | 497 | 8.3% |
| Vans | 645 | 10.8% |
| RVs | 842 | 14.1% |
| Tents | 1,073 | 18.0% |
| Makeshift Shelters | 1,174 | 19.6% |
This reporting demonstrates that the estimated unsheltered population within reach of Olympic venue security is substantial, but that the size of the affected population could vary greatly depend on how security perimeters are drawn. To see exactly where the affected population sits, visit the Map tab. For the full set of buffer scenarios (0.5, 1, and 2 miles) and the breakdown by unsheltered type, visit the Totals tab.
It’s worth noting that security planning is still in progress, and as operational details become public, the numbers in this report will need to be updated to reflect the changing context. Furthermore, this analysis is limited to the main game venues; it doesn’t yet account for the broader set of Olympics-adjacent infrastructure that will also see heightened security and enforcement, including UCLA as the Olympic Athletes’ Village, USC as the Media Village, and the major transit hubs and corridors that will carry the bulk of spectator traffic. Each of those is a plausible site of the same displacement pressure this report documents, and each would push the true affected population higher still.
Ultimately, the question this report raises is not just how many people, but what happens to them. Displacing unsheltered residents to make way for a “security perimeter” without a credible plan for shelter, services, or housing does not resolve homelessness; it merely hides it and shifts the burden onto unhoused individuals and their wellbeing. A three-week international event should not come at the cost of basic human dignity for the people who call these neighborhoods home. As Los Angeles finalizes its security footprint, how the city treats its unsheltered residents in the process will be as much a measure of its readiness to host the Olympics as any other aspect of its planning.
This will be the first of many reports on the home2028.la Olympics portal. Our first goal is to shine a spotlight on changes in enforcement and outreach that may emerge in the run-up to the Olympics. But we hope to go further, to have this portal serve as a clearinghouse for information and data that service providers, communities, and mutual aid groups can use to ensure the safety of all Angelenos.